Homeland security against possible terrorist attacks involves making decisions under true uncertainty. Not only are we ignorant of the form, place, and time of potential terrorist attacks, we are also largely ignorant of the likelihood of these attacks. In this paper, we conceptualize homeland security under true uncertainty as society's immunity to unacceptable losses. We illustrate and analyze the consequences of this notion of security with a simple model of allocating a fixed budget for homeland security to defending the pathways through which a terrorist may launch an attack and to mitigating the damage from an attack that evades this defense. In this problem, immunity is the range of uncertainty about the likelihood of an attack within which the actual expected loss will not exceed some critical value. We analyze the allocation of a fixed homeland security budget to defensive and mitigative efforts to maximize immunity to alternative levels of expected loss. We show that the production of homeland security involves a fundamental trade-off between immunity and acceptable loss; that is, for fixed resources that are optimally allocated to defense and mitigation, increasing immunity requires accepting higher expected losses, and reducing acceptable expected losses requires lower immunity. Greater investments in homeland security allow society to increase its immunity to a particular expected loss, reduce the expected losses to which we are immune while holding the degree of immunity constant, or some combination of increased immunity to a lower critical expected loss. 
Introduction
There are essentially three ways to protect a population from terrorist attacks: (1) neutralizing terrorists before they can mount attacks, (2) stopping attacks after they have been started but before they are completed, and (3) taking steps to reduce the severity of successful attacks. There clearly exists an economic problem in deciding how to divide fixed resources among these different functions. The last two, defending pathways through which an attack may occur and mitigating the effects of a failure of this defense, generally correspond to the responsibilities of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). A substantial part of its budget goes to a variety of efforts to intercept terrorist attacks before they can be consummated. Chief among these are the inspection programs put into place in the air, land, and sea entry ports of the country. Another portion of its budget goes to hardening potential targets and developing strategies to mitigate damage from attacks that elude detection.
Given known, or confidently estimated probability density functions over the form, place, and time of potential terrorist attacks, one could cast the problem of investing in security against terrorist attacks in the familiar terms of risk analysis.
1 For one example among several possibilities, one could model the choices of defense and mitigation to minimize the expected losses from terrorist attacks. In principle, probability distribution functions over terrorist attacks can be estimated from the frequency of past attacks. But while there has been significant work to develop and examine time series of terrorist events over reasonably long periods (Enders and Sandler, 2002; Mickolus et al., 1989 and 1993; Enders et al., 1992; O'Brien, 1996) it is not straightforward to turn frequencies of past attacks into current attack probabilities. Terrorists can choose innovative tactics, as happened on 9-11-01, in ways that are not readily predictable from past actions. Moreover, technological change (e.g., the internet), the rapid pace of globalization, and the ebb and flow of political movements produce novel opportunities that can only be roughly characterized by past attacks. Under contemporary circumstances, we are extremely pessimistic about our ability to estimate probability distribution functions over terrorist attacks with any degree of confidence. What this strongly suggests is that it may not be useful to think about homeland security against terrorism as decisions involving gambles with known probabilities. Instead, with respect to homeland security, we are truly in a world of Knightian uncertainty; that is, not only are we ignorant of the form, place, and time of potential terrorist attacks, we are also ignorant of the likelihood of these attacks. 2 Thus, any useful characterization of the definition and social choice of homeland security must account for this uncertainty.
In this paper we propose that security under true uncertainty can be usefully thought of as the degree of immunity against unacceptable expected losses from terrorist attacks. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that society's preference for security is monotonically increasing in the immunity to a particular loss, and decreasing in this loss while holding immunity constant. That is, we are more secure if we can achieve greater immunity to a particular critical loss, if we can reduce the critical loss without affecting the degree of immunity to this loss, or if we can achieve both increased immunity to lower loss.
We illustrate and analyze the consequences of this notion of security with a simple model of allocating a fixed budget to homeland security for efforts to stop a terrorist attack and efforts to mitigate the damage from an attack that evades our defenses. Within this problem immunity is the range of uncertainty about the likelihood of an attack within which the actual expected loss will not exceed some critical value. With this definition of security, we analyze the allocation of a fixed homeland security budget to defensive and mitigative efforts to maximize security to a truly uncertain terrorist attack. We demonstrate that defense is a normal input into the production of homeland security, while mitigation is an inferior input. That is, as society increases its investment in homeland security, more of these resources should be devoted to defense and less to mitigation. Moreover, we show that the production of homeland security involves a fundamental trade-off between immunity and acceptable loss; that is, for fixed resources that are optimally allocated to defense and mitigation, increasing immunity to loss requires accepting higher expected losses, and reducing acceptable expected losses requires lower immunity. Increasing security in the sense of increasing immunity to a particular expected loss, reducing the critical expected loss for the same degree of immunity, or a combination of increased immunity to a lower critical expected loss, is achievable only with a greater investment in homeland security.
Several approaches have been developed to analyze decision making under true uncertainty. These approaches include application of the maximin, maximax, Laplace, and Hurwitz criteria (Render et al., 2003) . While none of these criteria require knowledge of probability distributions for application, the first two represent polar extremes in terms of optimism and pessimism while the latter two require information similar to probabilities in order to be applied. Similarly, quantification of other notions related to uncertainty such as ignorance and surprise have also required the specification of functions confined to the unit interval (Katzner, 1998; Horan et al., 2002) . Additionally, Kelsey (1993) has proposed a decision theory requiring a ranking of event probabilities rather than a specific probability distribution. None of these decision criteria under uncertainty have achieved the widespread application in economics afforded traditional risk criteria. More importantly for our purposes, none of these decision criteria provide a natural conceptualization of the definition and pursuit of security under true uncertainty.
Our analysis is an application of Ben-Haim's (2006) information-gap decision theory.
3
The heart of Ben-Haim's approach is the pursuit of decisions that are robust in the sense that they maximize the range of uncertainty about model parameters within which the decision maker is certain to achieve a performance criterion. 4 In our problem of homeland security, we are uncertain about the likelihood of a terrorist attack but we seek to maximize the range of this uncertainty over which the expected loss from an attack will not exceed some critical value.
Thus, Ben-Haim's approach provides a useful way to define homeland security as immunity to unacceptable losses and to analyze its production.
Homeland Security Under True Uncertainty
The provision of homeland security against terrorism is exceedingly complex, involving defending the literally thousands of avenues through which terrorists might conceivably attack and investing in at least as many methods by which the effects of a successful attack can be mitigated. Our purpose, however, is not to model homeland security in all its complexity, but rather to formalize a useful definition of security against uncertain terrorist attacks and to analyze certain characteristics of its production. To that end we examine a situation in which a terrorist attack may be launched with an unknown probability through a large number of potential pathways. The number of these pathways is large enough that defending all of them is prohibitively costly. Since not all pathways can be defended, there is some likelihood that a terrorist attack will be successful, hence society invests in efforts to mitigate the loss from a successful attack. Though highly stylized, our approach is applicable to any situation involving defending one's borders against an attack that occurs with unknown probability and mitigating the effects of a failure in this defense.
A model of homeland security
Let N denote the number of pathways through which an attack on a nation may occur. The probability of an attack that may occur through any one of these pathways is p. The uncertainty in this model is about p-the probability that a terrorist has launched an attack is completely unknown. The pathways are identical in all regards, so a terrorist is indifferent about which pathway to attack. To defend against a potential attack, n N ≤ of the pathways are defended.
Since they are homogeneous, defended pathways are chosen at random. An attack on a defended pathway will be thwarted. Thus, the probability of a successful attack is the probability that an attack has been launched times the probability that the weapon gets through the nation's
A successful terrorist attack results in a certain loss L. 5 Mitigation efforts, m, reduce this potential loss, but at a decreasing rate. That is, the loss from a successful attack is L(m), with
Given the probability of an attack, p, the expected loss from an attack is . This value is unknown because the probability of an attack is completely unknown. We might, however, have complete confidence that the probability of an attack is no more than some value ; that is, we may be uncertain of the true probability of an attack, but we are certain that it does not exceed
The definition of homeland security under true uncertainty
We are now ready to formalize a definition of homeland security as the degree of immunity against unacceptable loss. Let L be a critical value for the expected loss from a terrorist attack, and consider the problem of maximizing the range of the probability of an attack within which the expected loss from a possible attack does not exceed L ; that is,
Given defense and mitigation efforts, ( ) (
The function ( , ; , ) 
The technology of security
Equation [2] describes the 'technology' of homeland security under true uncertainty. It characterizes society's opportunities for taking actions (defense and mitigation) to achieve alternative degrees of immunity to alternative levels of expected loss. In the next section, we will characterize the 'production' of homeland security as the allocation of defense and mitigation efforts that maximizes [2] , given the resources devoted to homeland security. Toward this end we first need to describe how ( , ; , ) c p n m L p varies with the number of defended pathways and efforts to mitigate the effects of a successful attack. The following proposition, which is proved in the appendix, provides this description: allocation of homeland security resources to defense and mitigation, which we explore next.
The Production of Homeland Security
Obviously, levels of homeland security depend on the resources devoted to it. Moreover, given the resources devoted to security, maximal security is attained by the efficient allocation of these resources to defense and mitigation efforts. Let R denote the monetary resources devoted to homeland security, and let denote the unit costs of defense and mitigation efforts, respectively. Then, the efficient allocation of resources to defense and mitigation to maximize immunity to a particular expected loss is the solution to: 
[6] 0. 
ii)
is increasing in R while m n * * is decreasing in R.
Part i) indicates that optimal defense and mitigation are independent of the critical expected loss. This is true because ( , ; , )
Part ii) of the proposition reveals that the number of defended pathways is a normal input in the production of security, while mitigation is an inferior input. Thus, increased resources allocated to homeland security should be devoted to defense, while at the same time decreasing mitigation efforts. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Clearly, since the marginal productivity of defense is increasing in higher levels of defense ( ), society should exploit this by allocating at least a part of an increase in security resources devoted to increased defense. However, doing so must be accompanied by a decrease in mitigation efforts. To understand why this must be the case, note that the first-order conditions [4] and [5] imply that defense and mitigation be chosen so that the ratio of the marginal products of these efforts in producing security is equal to the ratio of the prices of these efforts. We will not be analyzing the effects of changes in the costs of defense and mitigation on the optimal solution. 7 Therefore, Proposition 3 allows us to simply write the optimal values for defense and mitigation in terms of the resources devoted to homeland security; that is and . Then, maximal immunity to expected loss
Clearly, with respect to L , costs. Therefore, the optimal production of security is defined only over expected critical losses between zero and k L , inclusive. Thus, the following proposition completely characterizes the optimal production of homeland security.
Proposition 3: Given resources R devoted to homeland security, its optimal production is:
Our final proposition provides the fundamental characteristics of the optimal production of homeland security. It is proved in the appendix.
Part i) of the proposition indicates zero immunity against zero expected loss; that is, society has no confidence that the expected loss from a terrorist attack is zero. Part ii) indicates a fundamental tradeoff between immunity and expected loss. Given resources devoted to homeland security that are optimally allocated to defense and mitigation, increased immunity against unacceptable expected losses is attained only by tolerating higher expected losses.
However, parts iii) and iv) indicate that devoting more resources to homeland security allows the attainment of greater immunity to a particular expected loss, lower critical expected loss for the same degree of immunity, or some combination of greater immunity to lower critical expected loss. Moreover, given a critical expected loss
, immunity to this loss increases at an increasing rate with greater resources devoted to homeland security. 
Homeland security under true uncertainty about the probability of a terrorist attack is the degree of immunity to unacceptable expected losses. More rigorously, a point like ( , Figure 2 indicates the maximum probability of a terrorist attack, A p , up to which we are certain that the expected loss from such an attack does not exceed A L . Suppose that society devotes 0 R resources to defending against a terrorist attack and mitigating the effects of a successful attack, but achieves only ( , R to 1 R calls for allocating more of these resources to defense and less to mitigation.
To complete the analysis let us very briefly examine how possible corner solutions for the choice of defense or mitigation affect our main results. These situations may occur when -convex in (n, m) . Or, given that we know that defense is a normal input into the production of security while mitigation in an inferior input, very high levels of homeland security resources may call for devoting all of these resources to defense and none to mitigation.
Even in these corner-solution cases, ( , , ) c p L R p retains its essential characteristics provided in Proposition 4. If , all security resources are allocated to mitigation so that .
Then, 
It is straightforward to show that in these cases, ( , , ) c p L R p retains the same basic characteristics. The upshot then is that corner choices of defense and mitigation do not change the fundamental structure of the production of homeland security as characterized by Proposition 4.
Concluding Remarks: The Social Choice of Homeland Security
We have examined the definition and production of homeland security under true uncertainty about terrorist attacks. We have argued that the degree of immunity to unacceptable expected losses from terrorist attacks is a useful way to conceptualize security under true uncertainty. We have illustrated this concept of security with a model of allocating a fixed budget for homeland security to defending the pathways through which a terrorist may launch an attack and to efforts to mitigate the damage from an attack that evades this defense. Immunity to unacceptable losses in this problem is the range of uncertainty about the likelihood of an attack within which the actual expected loss will not exceed some critical value. Homeland security resources are optimally allocated to defense and mitigation to maximize immunity to alternative levels of expected loss. Our most important result is that the production of homeland security involves a fundamental trade-off between immunity and acceptable loss; that is, for fixed resources that are optimally allocated to defense and mitigation, increasing immunity to loss requires accepting higher expected losses, and reducing acceptable expected losses requires lower immunity.
Greater investments in homeland security allow society to increase security by increasing immunity to some critical expected loss, reducing the expected loss we are willing to tolerate while holding immunity to this loss constant, or some combination of increased immunity to a lower critical expected loss.
Although we have shown a useful way to think about the problem of homeland security and have analyzed characteristics of its production, we have said little about society's preference and choice of security. Indeed, the variables that are important for defining and producing security-degree of immunity, critical expected loss, and the resources devoted to homeland security-are all matters of social choice. We have assumed that society prefers greater immunity to lower expected loss, but we have shown that achieving both with fixed resources is not possible. Therefore, a fuller description of the relative values that society places on immunity and critical expected loss is necessary to analyze the social choice over these elements of homeland security. 
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